Inon the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the publication of the original essay, "The End of History? In watching The notion of the end of history is not an original one. Francis Fukuyama Nevertheless, this self-congratulatory book will probably be popular and widely discussed, like Fukuyama's National Interest essay, "The End of History? That the end of history is good news.
The past year has seen a flood of articles commemorating the end of the Cold War, and the fact that "peace" seems to be breaking out in many regions of the world.
Most of these analyses lack any larger conceptual framework for distinguishing between what is essential and what is contingent or accidental in world history, and are predictably superficial. Gorbachev were ousted from the Kremlin or a new Ayatollah proclaimed the millennium from a desolate Middle Eastern capital, these same commentators would scramble to announce the rebirth of a new era of conflict.
And yet, all of these people sense dimly that there is some larger process at work, a process that gives coherence and order to the daily headlines. The twentieth century saw the developed world descend into a paroxysm of ideological violence, as liberalism contended first with the remnants of absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism that threatened to lead to the ultimate apocalypse of nuclear war.
But the century that began full of Fukuyamas 1989 national interest essay the end of history in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism.
In the past decade, there have been unmistakable changes in the intellectual climate of the world's two largest communist countries, and the beginnings of significant reform movements in both.
But this phenomenon extends beyond high politics and it can be seen also in the ineluctable spread of consumerist Western culture in such diverse contexts as the peasants' markets and color television sets now omnipresent throughout China, the cooperative restaurants and clothing stores opened in the past year in Moscow, the Beethoven piped into Japanese department stores, and the rock music enjoyed alike in Prague, Rangoon, and Tehran.
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: This is not to say that there will no longer be events to fill the pages of Foreign Affair's yearly summaries of international relations, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in.
But there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run. To understand how this is so, we must first consider some theoretical issues concerning the nature of historical change.
Its best known propagator was Karl Marx, who believed that the direction of historical development was a purposeful one determined by the interplay of material forces, and would come to an end only with the achievement of a communist utopia that would finally resolve all prior contradictions.
But the concept of history as a dialectical process with a beginning, a middle, and an end was borrowed by Marx from his great German predecessor, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.
For better or worse, much of Hegel's historicism has become part of our contemporary intellectual baggage. The notion that mankind has progressed through a series of primitive stages of consciousness on his path to the present, and that these stages corresponded to concrete forms of social organization, such as tribal, slave-owning, theocratic, and finally democratic-egalitarian societies, has become inseparable from the modern understanding of man.
Hegel was the first philosopher to speak the language of modern social science, insofar as man for him was the product of his concrete historical and social environment and not, as earlier natural right theorists would have it, a collection of more or less fixed "natural" attributes.
The mastery and transformation of man's natural environment through the application of science and technology was originally not a Marxist concept, but a Hegelian one.
Unlike later historicists whose historical relativism degenerated into relativism tout court, however, Hegel believed that history culminated in an absolute moment - a moment in which a final, rational form of society and state became victorious.
It is Hegel's misfortune to be known now primarily as Marx's precursor; and it is our misfortune that few of us are familiar with Hegel's work from direct study, but only as it has been filtered through the distorting lens of Marxism. In France, however, there has been an effort to save Hegel from his Marxist interpreters and to resurrect him as the philosopher who most correctly speaks to our time.
For as early as this Hegel saw in Napoleon's defeat of the Prussian monarchy at the Battle of Jena the victory of the ideals of the French Revolution, and the imminent universalization of the state incorporating the principles of liberty and equality.
While there was considerable work to be done after - abolishing slavery and the slave trade, extending the franchise to workers, women, blacks, and other racial minorities, etc.
The two world wars in this century and their attendant revolutions and upheavals simply had the effect of extending those principles spatially, such that the various provinces of human civilization were brought up to the level of its most advanced outposts, and of forcing those societies in Europe and North America at the vanguard of civilization to implement their liberalism more fully.
The state that emerges at the end of history is liberal insofar as it recognizes and protects through a system of law man's universal right to freedom, and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed.
For human history and the conflict that characterized it was based on the existence of "contradictions":It's Still Not the End of History Twenty-five years after Francis Fukuyama's landmark essay, liberal democracy is increasingly beset.
Its defenders need to go back to the basics. Nov 23, · To further explore the idea of history with a beginning, middle and end, Fukuyama discusses the work of the philosopher who proposed the concept, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and the more recent interpretations of Hegel’s work by Alexandre Kojève.
Feb 12, · A CRITICAL SUMMARY OF FRANCIS FUKUYAMA’S “THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN” IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF SUMMER Fukuyama uses the phrase “end of history” to describe the end of human “ideological evolution,” that is, the search for the optimal government and economic system; the end point of humanity’s.
Nov 23, · Francis Fukuyama’s essay is another useful resource for us as it represents a different aspect of the civilization exclusivity question.
“The End of History?” concerns the rise and fall of major ideologies such as absolutism, fascism and communism, and suggests that human history should be viewed in terms of a battle of . Francis Fukuyama*, The National Interest, Summer In watching the flow of events over the past decade or so, it is hard to avoid the feeling that something very fundamental has happened in world history.
The End of History and the Last Man is a book by Francis Fukuyama, expanding on his essay "The End of History?", published in the .